· Saam Motamedi

Saam Motamedi: Greylock — The Enterprise AI Investment Thesis

Durable venture franchises win by anchoring on a service ethos, intersecting founders as early and raw as possible, eliminating market risk in favor of execution risk, and reinventing operations every era while keeping the underlying values fixed.

venture-capitalenterprise-aigreylockcompany-buildinghorizontal-softwarefirm-strategy0% confidence

Why this is in the corpus

Rare inside view of a 60-year-old top-tier venture firm with a deep apprenticeship model and an explicit thesis on horizontal AI enterprise software emerging in 2025-2026 with three confluent shifts (outcome pricing, end-to-end task atomic unit, dynamic data model).

Summary for skimmers

Saam Motamedi (GP at Greylock) explains how a 60-year-old firm sustains alpha through service ethos, an apprenticeship talent model, an inputs-based performance system, first-money/last-money barbell strategy, eliminating market risk before initiation, and a confluence-of-three thesis for new horizontal AI enterprise companies. Includes the 'capital river' framing, Greylock's three preserved durables (values, brand, network), and why turnover at large firms is bad for founders.

Briefing

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Principles

Durable claims that survive beyond the speaker's biography — each with explicit limits, transferability judgment, and evidence.

Principle

Founder, not firm, is the core of the company

Even when you co-develop the idea from zero, the founder must remain the core — terms must be market-fair.

Saam rejects 'incubate' as a word, citing firms taking 40% for $10M. Greylock writes a bit more capital for a bit more ownership at market terms.

Defend market-fair terms even in pre-idea backing.

who is the core of the company? Is it the founder or is it the VC firm? ...our view is to state the obvious, it''s the founderSaam Motamedi

Principle

Three durables in a venture firm: values, brand, network

Only three things actually persist across decades in a venture firm: core values, brand-as-credibility-vouch, and the relationship network.

Saam walks through how Greylock's brand flywheel works: stake credibility on a founder → founder builds → brand grows bigger than Greylock's → flywheel reverses. He traces the 18-year arc from a 2007 outreach to Josh McFarland → Teleport → Abnormal AI → Cogent & Fable Security as proof of the network durable.

When evaluating any long-lived institution, separate the durable substrate from the fluid surface tactics.

what are the core values and ethos of the firm? I think that gets embedded in the DNA and persists... the second dimension is the firm''s brand... and then the third is the networkSaam Motamedi

Principle

Causally impactful, not sourced — kill the attribution game

Replace 'who sourced it' with 'who was causally impactful' as the unit of credit inside a venture partnership.

Saam describes how Greylock removed the language of 'sourcing' to defuse the principal-agent problem: a senior partner's first reflex on intersecting an opportunity is to bring a younger partner in as the primary. This only works if attribution is structurally collaborative.

Audit how your firm or team assigns credit — the language is the incentive.

We use the language, were you causally impactful to a successful investment? That could mean you sourced it, it could mean you built a prepared mind, which enabled us to make a quick decisionSaam Motamedi

Principle

Partnership size caps cohesive decision-making around ~12

Cohesive partnership decision-making has a hard ceiling around 8-13 people.

Saam ties partnership size directly to turnover dynamics: large firms create subcommittees, low performers hide, strong performers feel diluted and leave.

Treat 12 as a soft cap on full-partnership decision groups.

we think above some group size it gets really hard to make cohesive decisions... whether that''s 8, 10, 12, 13, like we could debate that, but it''s sort of in that rangeSaam Motamedi

Principle

Insularity is the death of venture

Structurally fight insularity by meeting out-of-network founders monthly.

Saam admits less serendipity surface area than nine years ago — commits to one event per week and an out-of-network founder quota.

Put a monthly out-of-network founder quota on your calendar.

I try to make sure I meet some founders every month who are completely out of network... insularity is the death of this businessSaam Motamedi

Principle

Apprenticeship via osmosis — develop beginner''s mind through total immersion

Venture is a different business from any other business; hire for beginner''s mind and develop people through total co-presence in every decision.

Saam describes joining boards on day one, sitting next to partners in CEO interviews, and debriefing after every conversation about what was detected. The model assumes the apprentice is on a 20-30-40 year arc, so the upfront immersion cost is amortized over decades.

If you can''t put a new hire in every important room from day one, you''re not training judgment.

I joined the firm at 23. I immediately joined a number of boards alongside my partners. I was in every conversation with themSaam Motamedi

Principle

Inputs over outputs in long-cycle businesses

In long-cycle high-variance businesses, evaluate people on inputs not outputs — and reject good outputs with no inputs.

Greylock built an 18-input rubric across see/decide/win/build + internal partnership. They explicitly reject good outputs with no inputs because reproducibility is impossible.

Write down your inputs before luck arrives.

if we agree on what it means to be a good investor... if someone''s performing on those things, we can take long-term view on people and hopefully people get lucky early on. But if they don''t and they keep executing the inputs, we''ll take the bet that luck will come their waySaam Motamedi

Principle

Decision speed scales with clarity, not memo length

Investment decisions in hours are possible if you''ve done the prepared-mind work upfront — long memos are a substitute for missing context.

Saam contrasts 15-page memo eras vs current 2-paragraph eras at Greylock and concludes memo length doesn''t track decision quality for first-check investing.

Move rigor upstream — into prepared mind.

We only care about two things. One is who''s the person? And the second is what''s the general area in which they''re building it? And like if those two things are bright green, we''re ready to invest and we''ve made decisions in hoursSaam Motamedi

Principle

Take execution risk, not market risk

The best early-stage bets have zero market risk and high execution risk.

Saam frames every Greylock initiation as picking shapes like Workday (cloud HRIS replatform, demand obvious), Palo Alto Networks (10+ firewall companies, demand obvious), Abnormal AI ($2B email security TAM, 2 incumbents, demand obvious). The only question was 'can this team build the machine.'

Stop searching for unknown markets; back the best team to win a market that obviously exists.

what we wanna do is pick opportunities where there''s zero market risk and actually a lot of execution risk because in the execution risk you build, your remote products are hard to buildSaam Motamedi

Principle

Best supporting actor — venture is a service job, not a star vehicle

A venture firm's core ethos must be that no partner is ever larger than the companies and founders they back.

Greylock's founding partners encoded this as the operating constitution: minimal press, minimal marketing, partners never positioned as stars. Saam frames it as deciding where on a 1-10 spectrum from invisible to marketing-machine you live — and you can never be a 10 without compromising the ethos.

If your venture brand is louder than your portfolio, you've already started to decay.

the ambition of every Greylock partner should be to win the Oscar for the best supporting actor to the entrepreneurSaam Motamedi

Principle

Successful brands decay via refusal to reinvent

Default trajectory of a successful franchise is decay, driven by unwillingness to reinvent operations every era.

Saam cites Greylock''s recent moves: HQ to SF, younger team, multiple partner meetings per week — strategy unchanged in 20 years, operations radically changed.

If your firm operates as it did 5 years ago, you''re probably decaying.

there''s this weird empirical thing that happens when people become successful. They are not willing to reinvent themselves... the default trend line is one of decaySaam Motamedi

Frameworks

Reusable systems and operating models — including when they help and when they break.

Framework

Market-maker vs market-taker barbell — first money and last money

Venture alpha lives at the two ends of the barbell — first money in (raw founders, no auction) and last money in (rounds so big only ~10 firms can price them).

Diagnostic: are you creating a proprietary opportunity or competing in an auction? Saam credits Thrive, Founders Fund, Green Oaks at the late end; Greylock, Founders Fund, Sutter Hill, Zach Frankl-type investors at the early end. Both require real capability (raw company-building vs billion-dollar conviction), not just capital.

Audit your fund: are your wins on the barbell or in the auction middle?

are you a market maker or are you a market taker?... if you''re a market maker, there''s structurally more alpha than if you''re a market taker... where are there real market makers in the current era of venture? One is the people who are investing at the start... I actually think the other place is like the last money in and these really late stage private rounds where to price around you have to write a billion dollar checkSaam Motamedi

Framework

Ironman suit specialist model for portfolio support

Treat portfolio specialists as first-class peers, measure them quantitatively, and concentrate 90% of their bandwidth on the youngest companies where founders have no machinery of their own.

Greylock''s Glenn Evans (prior: Slack and Meta recruiting leadership) runs eng recruiting; specialists sit in weekly partner meetings; measure by engineers placed (19 at Resolve in 14 months). Capability + first-class status + concentration on early-stage is the system.

If your firm''s 'platform team' is a marketing function, it isn''t one.

the mental wallet I use is like we''re an Ironman suit. You as a new founder, you don''t have any of your own machinery. You plug into our Ironman suit, right? Now we''re recruiting for you, we''re helping you find customers... we''re not spending time on the late stage companies... 90% of their effort are on the companies that are just getting startedSaam Motamedi

Framework

Confluence of three for new horizontal enterprise software waves

New horizontal enterprise software waves only occur when pricing, work atomic unit, and data model all shift — generative AI is the first time all three have changed since the 2005 cloud boom.

Anil's diagnostic from a 2017 partner meeting (don''t do horizontal) reversed by 2023 (do horizontal): pricing shifted on-license → SaaS → outcome-based; atomic unit shifted workflow → end-to-end task; data model shifted on-prem → multi-tenant → dynamic generative schema. Mobile CRMs failed because none of the three changed.

Apply the three-shift test before betting on any horizontal disruption thesis.

now''s the time to go do new horizontal things. And why is it the time? Because it''s the first time since 2005... where you have the confluence of three things that need to be true in order to build new disruptive horizontal companies. One is there''s a new pricing model... The second is there''s a new abstraction or unit of value for work... And then the third is the data model''s differentSaam Motamedi

Signals

What appears to be shifting, for whom it matters, and what happens if you ignore it.

Signal

AI-era horizontal software wave starting 2025-2026

Multi-hundred-billion-dollar horizontal enterprise application businesses founded in 2025-2026 will dominate the next decade — first such window since 2005.

Saam ties this signal directly to the framework: 2005 produced Workday, Palo Alto (cloud confluence); 2025-2026 produces the analogous wave (AI confluence). CRM, service management, observability are explicitly named as targets.

If your AI thesis is vertical-only, you may be missing the larger wave.

I think we''re gonna see really really large horizontal companies get found that we''ll look back in a decade that were founded in 2025, 2026 that went after these large markets sold to everyone in the world. And that''s how you''ll build 10, 20, 30 billion revenue businesses and multi hundred billion dollar market cap application businessesSaam Motamedi

Signal

Pre-seed checks rising to $20-36M behind no-code, no-idea founders

Pre-seed check sizes at top firms have crossed $20-36M for known operators with no code and no idea — a new asset class within seed.

Saam frames this as Greylock writing multiple such checks in current fund — possible only because the founder is known well, the area is prepared-mind territory, and the firm can put the company in the capital river immediately.

If you''re a known operator, pre-seed terms are unrecognizable from 5 years ago.

We''re working on investment right now where we''re writing a $36 million pre-seed check... in this fund alone, we''re in multiple 20 to $30 million checks behind an individual with no code and no idea. Like a general sense of like, we''re gonna go explore this areaSaam Motamedi

Opportunities

Only included where there is a buyer, a real wedge, and a plausible revenue path — not vague idea theater.

Opportunity

Replatform CRM, service management, observability for AI atomic unit

CRM, service management, and observability are now disruptable for the first time in a generation because AI dissolves the structured-schema moat of incumbents.

Saam describes a CEO no longer needing reps to update Salesforce — AI integrates into email + granola + call recording and constructs the schema on the fly to serve the use case (pipeline forecast from texture of conversations). The system-of-record concept itself becomes obsolete as a defensive moat.

Don''t assume incumbents'' ontology moats survive AI-native UX.

why does the entrenchment of the system of record even matter? Like Salesforce has this whole schema... I''d argue that gives them a lot of defensibility. Why do you need that anymore? Like why should you as a CEO go hound your reps... I should have an AI system that integrates into email, into my granola... it''s just implicitly on the fly creating the data schema... you can go after CRM, you can go after service management, you can go after observabilitySaam Motamedi

Lessons still worth keeping

Useful takeaways that did not fully clear the bar for durable principle status.

Lesson

Greylock''s best seed investments come from long-known people

From a portfolio review: best pre-seed/seed bets are when Greylock has known the founder over very long periods — repeat founders, ex-portfolio operators, or industry relationships of mutual respect.

Saam describes a current $36M pre-seed check behind an individual with no code and no idea — only possible because of years of prior context. He contrasts this with two-week fundraising market processes where this kind of conviction is impossible.

Don''t expect your highest-conviction calls to come from market processes.

for our seed stage or preseed stage investments, I''m not talking about things in momentum. Our best investments are when we''ve gotten to know the person over very long periods of time... either we''ve backed them before, like we''ve had teams where they''re on their third company that''s been Greylock backed, they''ve worked at our companies before, or they''re just people in the industry who there was mutual respect and likingSaam Motamedi

Lesson

The 2021 mistake — confusing growth rate with growth-rate durability

Growth rate and growth-rate durability are different concepts; conflating them was the central pricing mistake of 2021 and is the live risk for current AI revenue ramps.

Saam recalls a 2021 piece arguing 100x ARR was cheap if growth held. The error was assuming 1→5 forecasts 5→50 → 500. COVID-era video conferencing pulled all demand forward; growth fell off a cliff. AI legal companies may now be repeating the pattern — every law firm bought this year.

Before paying a high multiple, model how much of the current growth is demand pull-forward.

what''s the mistake we all made in 2021?... we took growth rate to mean growth rate durability. And these are two different concepts... A major venture firm wrote this piece in 2021... 100x ARR multiples are not actually expensive... but the question is like, how many companies that went one to five actually go five to 50 in the next two years?Saam Motamedi

Lesson

The 18-year Josh McFarland → Abnormal AI → Cogent flywheel

One 2007 outreach to a Google PM produced (over 18 years) Teleport → Abnormal AI → Fable Security → Cogent — the network durable compounds only through real intimacy.

Saam uses this chain as proof that the network durable in venture is built through individual coffees with non-founders inside portfolio companies, not deal-flow alone. He notes the next generation of founders is already in the audience at the Cogent all-hands.

Have coffee with the non-founders at your portfolio companies — they''re your next decade of pipeline.

There''s a star product manager at Google named Josh McFarland... initiates a company at Greylock called Teleport... he hires a young engineer from Google, named Sanjay... Acquihires a small company called Ad Stack and has two co-founders, a founder named Evan Riser and a founder named Thanos... this company gets acquired by Twitter... we meet two new young, very strong product leaders... last year, you know they decide okay they want to go start new journeys. Both of them come back to Greylock and two new companies get started... fable security and cogentSaam Motamedi

The Plays

Try these this week

Verb-first executable actions — each one tied to a stated outcome in the episode.

Mandate 2-4 sector reviews per year per partner

Outcome: Each partner presents a 12-month point of view on their domain 2-4 times per year, then the partnership debates and later checks accuracy.

Context: Saam ties sector reviews directly to decision velocity: when service management/IT desk is identified as red-hot, all 11 partners have prepared mind, so the next company they meet gets a fast decision. Accountability comes from comparing presented POV to what actually happened.

we do a lot of internally at Greylock we do these things called sector reviews. Two to four times a year we present internally on like, okay, if I''m covering AI applications, what do I think is gonna happen in the next 12 months? And then we look... did you actually understand what was happening in your domain?
Saam Motamedi
Quarterly cadence per
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Before you start

  • · Defined sector taxonomy
  • · Partnership time commitment
  • · Accountability willingness — accept being scored on POV

Protect Day-a-Week and morning blocks of unscheduled time

Outcome: Block one full unscheduled day per week and unscheduled mornings until 11am to preserve long-term thinking and sprint capacity.

Context: Saam frames this as a learned skill ("I''m just very good at saying no"). The argument is that good venture work is bursty — detect when you need 110mph and accelerate — but you can''t accelerate if you''re already maxed out every day.

I try to keep one day a week completely unscheduled and then I try to keep my mornings unscheduled until like 11. Because once you have a portfolio and a team, like at some point in the day, your day becomes entirely reactive. And so you have to be incredibly intentional about scheduling time to do like long-term thinking, long-term work
Saam Motamedi
Daily/weekly per
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Before you start

  • · EA aligned
  • · Partnership tolerance for unavailability
  • · Willingness to disappoint short-term asks

Run portfolio reviews to detect pattern of misses-due-to-rawness

Outcome: Periodically review competitor-won deals you also saw, categorize the reasons for missing, surface structural patterns (e.g., "too raw" follow-up failures).

Context: Saam describes the top takeaway from a recent review: "we met things when they were too raw." Pattern: smart founder + bad area → no follow up → 6 weeks later they pivot to great area → returns later at series A at 5-10x price. Fix: maintain relationships with raw-stage smart people regardless of current idea.

we do these competitive reviews... we were doing one two weeks ago and we saw all these great investments that we didn''t make, but we saw them and we''re like, and our number one takeaway was we met things when they were too raw
Saam Motamedi
Quarterly per
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Before you start

  • · Pipeline tracking with pass reasons
  • · Honest retrospective culture
  • · Time block for review work

Run a weekly competitor-financing tracker across core sectors

Outcome: Maintain a weekly tracker of competitor financings by sector, score yourself on 'did we see or have the right to do' coverage, target 70-75%+.

Context: Saam runs this for six core Greylock sectors. The discipline is to require the team to be in position with 10+ days before decision — not just to have met. Falling below 70% in a sector signals that the team is making investments without seeing what competitors see, which Saam calls 'arrogant.'

there''s six core sectors we invest in at Greylock for all those sectors. We have a list of the competitors we most admire firms and individuals. And every week we track all the financings that have gone and done by those groups. And we ask ourselves the question, did we see or have the right to do that financing?
Saam Motamedi
Weekly cadence, ongoing per
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Before you start

  • · Defined sector taxonomy
  • · Curated competitor list
  • · Pipeline tracking system
  • · Partner buy-in to surface own misses

Embed specialists in partner meetings, measure their output quantitatively

Outcome: Treat specialist function leaders as first-class members of the partnership: in every weekly meeting, scored on quantitative output (engineers placed, customers introduced).

Context: Saam contrasts Greylock''s model with firms that view portfolio services as marketing. Glenn Evans (Slack + Meta recruiting heritage) runs Greylock''s engineering recruiting. Specialists sit in weekly partner meetings, are factored into decisions, and are evaluated on placement numbers — not vanity metrics.

they sit in our weekly partner meetings. They''re like a key part of every firm decision we make... we measure things like how many engineers did we place at our portfolio companies. Like we backed Resolve when it got started last year in the last 14 months we''ve been in business with them, we''ve placed 19 engineers
Saam Motamedi
Continuous per
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Before you start

  • · Top-tier specialist hires
  • · Partnership commitment to first-class status
  • · Willingness to deprioritize late-stage support

Hold a 2-day inputs offsite to define 18 performance inputs

Outcome: Run a 2-day offsite to define ~18 inputs across the 4 job dimensions (see/decide/win/build) plus internal partnership, then 360-score quarterly.

Context: Saam describes Greylock''s post-COVID 2021 Napa offsite. The 18 inputs map to the job''s four functions plus partnership behaviors. Examples: did you see 75% of seed/Series A in your sector? Responsiveness SLA. Domain leadership (sector reviews 2-4x/year). Firm-impact contributions independent of personal investments.

We in the last several years have adopted what we call like an inputs based approach to performance management. So we got together as a full partnership. It was right after COVID, so I wanna say in like 2021. And we sat together in Napa for two days and we said let''s build a set of inputs that we would all agree
Saam Motamedi
2-day offsite + quarterly review cadence per
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Before you start

  • · Full partnership commitment
  • · Willingness to apply rubric to all partners including senior
  • · Acceptance that good outputs with no inputs is not enough

Decision Moments

Actual decisions, real outcomes

Specific decisions narrated in the episode with their outcomes and transferable lessons.

Post-COVID 2021, Greylock partnership needed a way to evaluate partners that wasn''t hostage to long output cycles and luck.

Did: Held a 2-day partnership offsite in Napa to define 18 performance inputs across the four job functions (see/decide/win/build) plus internal partnership. Adopted 360-style scoring on those inputs; reject good outputs without inputs.Outcome: Greylock now empowers young partners on inputs (e.g., 75% competitor coverage, responsiveness SLA, 2-4 sector reviews/year) without waiting for output proof.

In long-cycle businesses, write down inputs before luck arrives.

Part of an emerging decision pattern across multiple episodes

2023 — Anil reversed his 2017 advice against horizontal software at a Greylock partner meeting. Firm faced reallocating from vertical SaaS bias to horizontal AI disruption.

Did: Adopted confluence-of-three diagnostic (pricing + atomic unit + data model). Concluded all three conditions live for first time since 2005. Reallocated toward horizontal AI-native CRM/observability/service management with $20-36M pre-seed checks.Outcome: Multiple 20-36M pre-seed checks deployed in current $1B fund (93% allocated at first-institutional-check stage). Thesis predicts 10-30B revenue horizontal application businesses founded 2025-2026.

When all three structural conditions align, contrarian frameworks can reverse — the discipline is the diagnostic, not the bias.

Part of an emerging decision pattern across multiple episodes

Greylock watched competitor firms scale to 50+ partners and 100+ investments per partner. Faced choice to scale partnership or preserve concentration.

Did: Chose to cap partnership ~12, refuse subcommittees, run all decisions through full partnership, maintain ~20-30 core relationships per fund. Moved HQ to SF, hired younger, accelerated meeting cadence but did not scale headcount.Outcome: Preserved decision quality and ethos at the cost of AUM scale.

Partnership size is a strategic choice with direct effects on incentives, turnover, and founder service quality.

2007 — Greylock reached out to Josh McFarland (Google PM); he declined investor role but wanted to start a company.

Did: Brought him into Greylock office as EIR, backed Teleport. Maintained intimacy through hires. After Twitter acquisition, brought head-of-eng Wade as EIR, who introduced Sanjay + Evan → built Abnormal AI. Two Abnormal leaders returned → Fable Security and Cogent.Outcome: 18-year chain: 1 outreach produced four Greylock-backed companies including a near-public outcome.

Network durability compounds via portfolio-company employees, not just founders.

Part of an emerging decision pattern across multiple episodes

Tensions surfaced

Contradictions and trade-offs the episode raises — judgment calls a thoughtful operator has to navigate.

Tension

Patience vs FOMO when competitors price up companies you passed on

Watching companies you passed on get hot is painful but the cycle proves the original read is usually right — the resolution is checking fundamentals not market signals.

Saam recalls 2019-2021 passes that became unicorns then exited below preference stack. The discipline is to ask 'did fundamentals change' not 'did valuation change.' Charlie Munger / Buffett analogue: most things don''t matter, study and stay quiet.

When a passed-on deal gets hot, do not revisit valuation — revisit fundamentals only.

it''s so painful. They''re like, we didn''t do this and just got three new rounds got done and it''s like, okay, well did the fundamentals change? Like maybe we were wrong and their cases we''re wrong... but there are gonna be many cases where initial read was right. It''s just gonna take time for it to play out... how do you have that patient and that conviction in your own framework to like not get caught up in that race? Because everyone who gets caught up in that race, I think failsSaam Motamedi

Tension

Depth vs breadth — close relationships vs full market coverage

Concentrated relationship depth and full market coverage seem opposed but resolve through measurement: track competitor-led financings weekly, demand 70-75%+ 'right to do' coverage.

Saam explicitly poses this as a tension: relationship depth would suggest small surface area; market awareness demands wide surface area. Greylock''s resolution is a weekly competitor financing tracker covering six core sectors — depth is preserved in portfolio, breadth is preserved in measurement.

If you don''t measure your right-to-do rate, you don''t know if your depth is producing alpha or arrogance.

everything you''ve talked about so far is sort of you advocating for depth... But I also know from knowing you well that you care a lot about seeing a lot of the market... they seem at odds... despite the let''s say focus and depth of relationship, we care a lot about our capital competing against the opportunity set in the marketplace... we have a list of the competitors we most admire... every week we track all the financings that have gone and done by those groups. And we ask ourselves the question, did we see or have the right to do that financing?Saam Motamedi

Corpus connection

Where this episode fits for retrieval

What kinds of decisions this briefing is best pulled into.

Primary decisions

  • strategic-bet
  • hire
  • fundraise
  • market-entry